CRITICALISSUESINPOLICINGSERIES
UseofForce:TakingPolicingtoaHigherStandard
January29,2016
30GuidingPrinciples
Note:Acomprehensiveapproachwillberequiredtoimplementthechangesdescribedinthisdocument.
Thepolicies,training,tactics,andrecommendationsforequipmentdetailedinthisdocumentamounttosignificant,fundamentalchangesinapolicedepartment’soperationsandculture.Itisimportantthatthesechangesbeundertakeninacomprehensivemanner,andnotinapiecemealorhaphazardway.Thepolicychangesmustbebackedupwiththorough,integratedretrainingofallofficers.
Thesechangeshaveimplicationsforofficersafety.Thisapproachcanincreaseofficersafety,aswellasthesafetyofcommunitymembers,byteachingofficershowto“slowdown”someincidentsandavoidescalatingsituationstothepointwhereofficersormembersofthepublicareendangered.Buttobetterprotectofficers,agenciesmustprovidecomprehensivenewtraining,newtacticalskills,andnewequipmenttosupportthenewpolicies.
GuidingPrinciples:PolicyPOLICY1.Thesanctityofhumanlifeshouldbeattheheartofeverythinganagencydoes. Agencymissionstatements,policies,andtrainingcurriculashouldemphasizethesanctityofallhumanlife—thegeneralpublic,policeofficers,andcriminalsuspects—andtheimportanceoftreatingallpersonswithdignityandrespect.
POLICY2.DepartmentsshouldadoptpoliciesthatholdthemselvestoahigherstandardthanthelegalrequirementsofGrahamv.Connor. Agencyuse-of-forcepoliciesshouldgobeyondthelegalstandardof“objectivereasonableness”outlinedinthe1989U.S.SupremeCourtdecisionGrahamv.Connor.Thislandmarkdecisionshouldbeseenas“necessarybutnotsufficient,”becauseitdoesnotprovidepolicewithsufficientguidanceonuseofforce.Asaresult,prosecutorsandgrandjuriesoftenfindthatafatalshootingbyanofficerisnotacrime,eventhoughtheymaynotconsidertheuseofforceproportionalornecessary.Agenciesshouldadoptpoliciesandtrainingtoholdthemselvestoahigherstandard,basedonsoundtactics,considerationofwhethertheuseofforcewasproportionaltothethreat,andthesanctityofhumanlife. Manypoliceagenciesalreadyhavepoliciesthatgobeyondlegalrequirements.Forexample,manypoliceagencieshaveadoptedpursuitpolicies,andrulesbarringofficersfromshootingatorfrommovingvehicles,thatgobeyondcurrentlegalprecedents.
POLICY3.Policeuseofforcemustmeetthetestofproportionality. Inassessingwhetheraresponseisproportional,officersmustaskthemselves,“Howwouldthegeneralpublicviewtheactionwetook?Wouldtheythinkitwasappropriatetotheentiresituationandtotheseverityofthethreatposedtomeortothepublic?”
POLICY4.Adoptde-escalationasformalagencypolicy. AgenciesshouldadoptGeneralOrdersand/orpolicystatementsmakingitclearthatde-escalationisthepreferred,tacticallysoundapproachinmanycriticalincidents.GeneralOrdersshouldrequireofficerstoreceivetrainingonkeyde-escalationprinciples.Manyagenciesalreadyprovidecrisisinterventiontrainingasakeyelementofde-escalation,butcrisisinterventionpoliciesandtrainingmustbemergedwithanewfocusontacticsthatofficerscanusetode-escalatesituations.De-escalationpolicyshouldalsoincludediscussionofproportionality,usingdistanceandcover,tacticalrepositioning,“slowingdown”situationsthatdonotposeanimmediatethreat,callingforsupervisoryandotherresources,etc.Officersmustbetrainedintheseprinciples,andtheirsupervisorsshouldholdthemaccountableforadheringtothem.
POLICY5.TheCriticalDecision-MakingModelprovidesanewwaytoapproachcriticalincidents. Policyonuseofforceshouldbebasedontheconceptofofficersusingadecision-makingframeworkduringcriticalincidentsandothertacticalsituations.DepartmentsshouldconsideradoptingtheCriticalDecision-MakingModel(CDM),whichPERFhasadaptedfromtheUnitedKingdom’sNationalDecisionModel.TheCDMprovidesofficerswithalogical,easy-to-usethoughtprocessforquicklyanalyzingandrespondingappropriatelytoarangeofincidents.TheCDMguidesofficersthroughaprocessof:
• Collectinginformation,• Assessingthesituation,threats,andrisks,• Consideringpolicepowersandagencypolicy,• Identifyingoptionsanddeterminingthebestcourseofaction,and• Acting,reviewing,andre-assessingthesituation.
TheCDMisaconstructiveprocessthatprovidesaframeworkforgoingbeyondtheminimumlegalstandardofobjectivereasonableness.POLICY6.Dutytointervene:Officersneedtopreventotherofficersfromusingexcessiveforce. Officersshouldbeobligatedtointervenewhentheybelieveanotherofficerisabouttouseexcessiveorunnecessaryforce,orwhentheywitnesscolleaguesusingexcessiveorunnecessaryforce,orengaginginothermisconduct.Agenciesshouldalsotrainofficersto
detectwarningsignsthatanotherofficermightbemovingtowardexcessiveorunnecessaryforceandtointervenebeforethesituationescalates.
POLICY7.Respectthesanctityoflifebypromptlyrenderingfirstaid. Officersshouldrenderfirstaidtosubjectswhohavebeeninjuredasaresultofpoliceactionsandshouldpromptlyrequestmedicalassistance.
POLICY8.Shootingatvehiclesmustbestrictlyprohibited. Agenciesshouldadoptastrictprohibitionagainstshootingatorfromamovingvehicleunlesssomeoneinthevehicleisusingorthreateningdeadlyforcebymeansotherthanthevehicleitself.
POLICY9.Prohibituseofdeadlyforceagainstindividualswhoposeadangeronlytothemselves. Agenciesshouldprohibittheuseofdeadlyforce,andcarefullyconsidertheuseofmanyless-lethaloptions,againstindividualswhoposeadangeronlytothemselvesandnottoothermembersofthepublicortoofficers.Officersshouldbepreparedtoexerciseconsiderablediscretiontowaitaslongasnecessarysothatthesituationcanberesolvedpeacefully.
POLICY10.Documentuse-of-forceincidents,andreviewyourdataandenforcementpracticestoensurethattheyarefairandnon-discriminatory. Agenciesshoulddocumentallusesofforcethatinvolveahandorlegtechnique;theuseofadeadlyweapon,less-lethalweapon,orweaponofopportunity;oranyinstancewhereinjuryisobservedorallegedbythesubject.Inaddition,agenciesshouldcaptureandreviewreportsonthepointingofafirearmoranelectroniccontrolweaponatanindividualasathreatofforce. Thisinformationiscriticalforbothexternalreportingandinternalimprovementstopolicyandtraining.Agenciesshouldconsultwiththeircommunitiestoensurethatuseofforceandenforcementpracticesarenotdiscriminatory. Agenciesshoulddevelopstrongpoliciesandprotocolsforreviewingalluse-of-forcereportstoensureaccuracyandcompleteness,includingcomparingwrittenreportswithvideofootagefrombody-worncameras,dashboardcameras,andothersources.Specialattentionshouldbepaidtoensuringthatreportsprovideclearandspecificdetailsabouttheincidentandavoidgeneric,“boilerplate”language.
POLICY11.Tobuildunderstandingandtrust,agenciesshouldissueregularreportstothepubliconuseofforce. Agenciesshouldpublishregularreportsontheirofficers’useofforce,includingofficer-involvedshootings,deploymentofless-lethaloptions,anduseofcanines.Thesereportsshouldincludediscussionofracialissuesandeffortstopreventalltypesofbiasanddiscrimination. Thesereportsshouldbepublishedannuallyataminimum,andshouldbewidelyavailablethroughtheagency’swebsiteandinhardcopy.
POLICY12.Allcriticalpoliceincidentsresultingindeathorseriousbodilyinjuryshouldbereviewedbyspeciallytrainedpersonnel. Incidentsthatinvolvedeathorseriousinjuryasaresultofapoliceactionshouldbereviewedbyateamofspeciallytrainedpersonnel.Thiscanbedoneeitherwithintheagencythroughaseparate“forceinvestigationunit”thathasappropriateresources,expertise,andcommunitytrust,orbyanotherlawenforcementagencythathastheresources,expertise,andcredibilitytoconducttheinvestigation.Otherusesofforceshouldbeinvestigatedbytheofficer’ssupervisorandreviewedthroughthechainofcommand.Supervisorsshouldrespondtothesceneofanyuse-of-forceincidenttoinitiatetheinvestigation.Agenciesshouldthoroughlyinvestigateallnon-training-relatedfirearmsdischarges,regardlessofwhetherthesubjectwasstruck.
POLICY13.Agenciesneedtobetransparentinprovidinginformationfollowinguse-of-forceincidents. Agenciesthatexperienceanofficer-involvedshootingorotherserioususe-of-forceincidentshouldreleaseasmuchinformationaspossibletothepublic,asquicklyaspossible,acknowledgingthattheinformationispreliminaryandmaychangeasmoredetailsunfold.Ataminimum,agenciesshouldreleasebasic,preliminaryinformationaboutanincidentwithinhoursofitsoccurrence,andshouldprovideregularupdatesasnewinformationbecomesavailable(astheywouldwithotherseriousincidentsthatthepublicandthenewsmediaareinterestedin).
GuidingPrinciples:TrainingandTacticsTRAININGANDTACTICS14.Trainingacademycontentandculturemustreflectagencyvalues. Thecontentofpolicetrainingandtrainingacademycultureshouldreflectthecorevalues,attributes,andskillsthattheagencywantsitspersonneltoexhibitintheirworkin
thecommunity.Chiefexecutivesortheirdesigneesshouldaudittrainingclassestodeterminewhethertrainingisuptodateandreflectstheagency’smissionandvalues.Thisvalues-basedtrainingculturemustextendtotheagency’sfieldtrainingandin-servicetrainingprogramsaswell.
TRAININGANDTACTICS15.OfficersshouldbetrainedtouseaCriticalDecision-MakingModel. AsmentionedinRecommendation5inthePolicysectionofthisdocument,agenciesshouldtrainofficerstouseadecision-makingframeworkduringcriticalincidentsandothertacticalsituations. TheCDMprovidesaframeworkforgoingbeyondtheminimumstandardofobjectivereasonableness.
TRAININGANDTACTICS16.UseDistance,Cover,andTimetoreplaceoutdatedconceptssuchasthe“21-footrule”and“drawingalineinthesand.” Agenciesshouldtraintheirofficersontheprinciplesofusingdistance,cover,andtimewhenapproachingandmanagingcertaincriticalincidents.Inmanysituations,abetteroutcomecanresultifofficerscanbuymoretimetoassessthesituationandtheiroptions,bringadditionalresourcestothescene,anddevelopaplanforresolvingtheincidentwithoutuseofforce. Agenciesshouldeliminatefromtheirpoliciesandtrainingallreferencestotheso-called“21-footrule”regardingofficerswhoareconfrontedwithasubjectarmedwithanedgedweapon.Instead,officersshouldbetrainedtousedistanceandcovertocreatea“reactiongap”betweenthemselvesandtheindividual,andtoconsideralloptionsforresponding.
TRAININGANDTACTICS17.De-escalationshouldbeacorethemeofanagency’strainingprogram. Agenciesshouldtraintheirofficersonacomprehensiveprogramofde-escalationstrategiesandtactics.De-escalationcanbeusedinarangeofsituations,especiallywhenconfrontingsubjectswhoarecombativeand/orsufferingacrisisbecauseofmentalillness,substanceabuse,developmentaldisabilities,orotherconditionsthatcancausethemtobehaveerraticallyanddangerously.De-escalationstrategiesshouldbebasedonthefollowingkeyprinciples:
• Effectivecommunicationisenoughtoresolvemanysituations;communicationsshouldbethefirstoption,andofficersshouldmaintaincommunicationthroughoutanyencounter.
• Indifficultsituations,communicationsoftenaremoreeffectivewhentheybeginata“lowlevel,”e.g.,officersspeakingcalmlyandinanormaltoneofvoice,andaskingquestionsratherthanissuingorders.
• Wheneverpossible,officersshouldbetrainedtousedistanceandcoverto“slowthesituationdown”andcreatemoretimeforthemtocontinuecommunicatinganddevelopingoptions.
• Ifanencounterrequiresauseofforce,officersshouldstartatthelowestlevelofforcethatispossibleandsafe.Officersshouldneverdoanythingtoescalateasituationthemselves.
• Asthesituationandthreatschange,officersshouldre-evaluatethemandrespondproportionally;insomecases,thiswillmeandeployingahigherforceoption,inothersaloweroption,dependingonthecircumstances.
TRAININGANDTACTICS18.De-escalationstartswitheffectivecommunications.Toeffectivelycarryouttheagency’sde-escalationstrategies,allofficersshouldreceiverigorousandongoingtrainingoncommunicationsskills.Officersshouldbetrainedtoeffectivelycommunicateinarangeofsituations,includingeverydayinteractionswhileonduty,publicspeakingandmeetingfacilitation,interactingwithvictimsandwitnesses,handlingcriticalincidents,anddealingwithpeoplewithmentalhealthand/orsubstanceabuseproblems.Allofficersshouldalsoreceivetrainingonbasicnegotiationstechniques.
TRAININGANDTACTICS19.MentalIllness:Implementacomprehensiveagencytrainingprogramondealingwithpeoplewithmentalhealthissues. Officersmustbetrainedinhowtorecognizepeoplewithmentalhealthissuesanddealwiththeminasafeandhumanemanner.AsmentionedinthePolicySectionofthisdocument,manyagenciesalreadyprovidesomeformofcrisisinterventiontrainingasakeyelementofde-escalation,butcrisisinterventionpoliciesandtrainingmustbemergedwithanewfocusontacticsthatofficerscanusetode-escalatesituations.Ataminimum,agenciesshouldseekto:
• Provideallofficerswithawarenessandrecognitionofmentalhealthandsubstanceabuseissues,aswellasbasictechniquesforcommunicatingwithpeoplewiththeseproblems.
• Providein-depthtraining(forexample,the40-hourCrisisInterventionTeamor“CIT”training)toasubsetofofficersandfieldsupervisors(preferablythosewhohaveindicatedaninterestinthisarea)withthegoalofhavingCIT-trainedpersonnelondutyatalltimes.Thistrainingshouldfocusheavilyoncommunicationandde-escalationstrategies.
• Someagenciesmaychoosetoprovidein-depthCITtrainingtoalloftheirpersonnel.• CrisisInterventionTeams,madeupofpoliceofficersandmentalhealthworkers,
canbethemosteffectiveoption.Theseteamsarecalledtorespondtoallincidentsinvolvingmentalillnessorsimilarissues,andthusdevelopexpertise,aswellasfamiliaritywithindividualswhogeneratemultiplecallsforserviceovertime.In
somecases,CrisisInterventionTeamsalsoworktosolveunderlyingproblemsbyhelpingpersonswithmentalillnesstoobtaintreatment.
• Foralloftheirmentalhealthtraining,agenciesshouldcoordinatewithlocalmentalhealthprofessionalsoncontentanddelivery.
TRAININGANDTACTICS20.Tacticaltrainingandmentalhealthtrainingneedtobeinterwoventoimproveresponsetocriticalincidents. Asnotedabove,strategiesfordealingwithpeoplewithmentalhealthproblemsshouldbewovenintothetacticaltrainingthatallofficersreceive,withastrongemphasisoncommunications,de-escalationtechniques,maintainingcoveranddistance,andallowingforthetimeneededtoresolvetheincidentsafelyforeveryone.Officerswhorespondtoscenesinvolvingpeoplewithmentalhealthproblemsshouldbedirectedtocallforassistancefromspeciallytrainedofficersand/orsupervisors(e.g.,CIT-trained)ifpossible.Asabestpractice,thosespeciallytrainedpersonnelshouldbegiventheauthoritytomanageasceneregardlessofrank.Allotherrespondingunitsshouldbedirectedtotheon-scenemanager,briefedonthesituation,anddirectedtofollowtheon-scenemanager’sleadwithrespecttotacticsandespeciallyanyuseofforce.
TRAININGANDTACTICS21.Community-basedoutreachteamscanbeavaluablecomponenttoagencies’mentalhealthresponse. Whereresourcesexist,agenciesshouldpartnerwiththeirlocalmentalhealthservicecommunitytoassistwithtraining,policydevelopment,proactivelyworkingwithpeoplewithmentalhealthproblems,andrespondingtocriticalincidents.Mentalhealthstreetoutreachandcrisisresponseteamscanprovidevaluablesupporttothepoliceresponsetotheseincidentsandassistwithde-escalationstrategiesdirectedatpersonswithmentalhealthproblems.
TRAININGANDTACTICS22.Provideapromptsupervisoryresponsetocriticalincidentstoreducethelikelihoodofunnecessaryforce. Supervisorsshouldimmediatelyrespondtoanyscene:
• Whereaweapon(includingfirearm,edgedweapon,rocks,orotherimprovisedweapon)isreported,
• Wherepersonswithmentalhealthproblemsarereported,or• Whereadispatcherorothermemberofthedepartmentbelievesthereispotential
foruseofforce. Onceonthesceneandifcircumstancespermit,supervisorsshouldattemptto“huddle”withofficersbeforerespondingtodevelopaplanofactionthatfocusesonde-escalationwherepossible.Inthecaseofpersonswithmentalhealthproblems,supervisors
whoarenotspeciallytrainedshouldconsultandcoordinatewithofficersonthescenewhoarespeciallytrained.TRAININGANDTACTICS23.Trainingasteamscanimproveperformanceinthefield. Agenciesshouldprovidein-servicetrainingoncriticaldecision-making,de-escalation,anduseofforcetoteamsofofficersatthesametime.Whenofficerswhoworktogetheronadailybasistraintogether,coordinationandconsistencyintacticsincrease,andthelikelihoodofundesirableoutcomesduringcriticalincidentsdecreases.Recognizingthatthisapproachmayincreasecostsanddisruptscheduling,agenciesshouldconsideralternativearrangementstotraditional,day-longin-servicetrainingclasses—forexample,bybringinginateamofofficersforafewhoursoftrainingseveraltimesayear.
TRAININGANDTACTICS24.Scenario-basedtrainingshouldbeprevalent,challenging,andrealistic. Inbothrecruitandin-serviceprograms,agenciesshouldprovideuse-of-forcetrainingthatutilizesrealisticandchallengingscenariosthatofficersarelikelytoencounterinthefield.Scenariosshouldbebasedonreal-lifesituationsandutilizeencountersthatofficersintheagencyhaverecentlyfaced.Scenariosshouldgobeyondthetraditional“shoot-don’tshoot”decision-making,insteadprovidingforavarietyofpossibleoutcomes,includingsomeinwhichcommunication,de-escalation,anduseofless-lethaloptionsaremostappropriate.Scenario-basedtrainingfocusedondecision-makingshouldbeintegratedwithofficers’regularrequalificationontheirfirearmsandless-lethalequipment.
GuidingPrinciples:EquipmentEQUIPMENT25.Officersneedaccesstoandtraininginless-lethaloptions. Patrolofficersshouldbegivenaccessto,andregulartrainingin,anappropriaterangeofless-lethalweaponsandequipmenttosupporttheircriticaldecision-makingandde-escalationefforts.Personnelspeciallytrainedinmentalhealthissuesshouldbeissuedandtrainedinthefullrangeofless-lethaloptionsofferedbytheagency.
EQUIPMENT26.Agenciesshouldconsidernewoptionsforchemicalspray. Agenciesshouldevaluatetheircurrentpoliciesandpracticesontheuseofchemicalspray,andconsideralternativesthataddressofficers’concernsovercross-contaminationandflammability.OnealternativethatagenciescanconsiderisPAVAspray(pelargonicacidvanillylamide),whichisnowwidelyusedintheUnitedKingdom.UnliketraditionalCSorOC
sprays,PAVAhasamoreconcentratedstreamthatminimizescross-contaminationandisnotflammable(meaningitcanbeusedinconjunctionwithanelectroniccontrolweapon).
EQUIPMENT27.AnECWdeploymentthatisnoteffectivedoesnotmeanthatofficersshouldautomaticallymovetotheirfirearms. Agenciesshouldensurethattheirpolicies,training,andproceduresaroundtheuseofelectroniccontrolweapons(ECWs)areconsistentwiththe53guidelinesreleasedbyPERFandtheCOPSOfficein2011.1 Accountsoffatalpoliceshootingsoftenstatethat“theofficertriedanECW,ithadnoeffect,andsotheofficerthenusedafirearm.”Thisisaninappropriatewaytoviewforceoptions.ECWsoftendonotworkbecausethesubjectiswearingheavyclothingorformanyotherreasons.AnECWdeploymentthatisnoteffectivedoesnotmeanofficersshouldautomaticallymovetotheirfirearms.UndertheCriticalDecision-MakingModel,anineffectiveECWdeploymentchangesthesituationandshouldpromptofficerstore-assessthesituationandthecurrentstatusofthethreat,andtotakeappropriate,proportionalactions.EQUIPMENT28.Personalprotectionshieldsmaysupportde-escalationeffortsduringcriticalincidents,includingsituationsinvolvingpersonswithknives,baseballbats,orotherimprovisedweaponsthatarenotfirearms. Agenciesshouldacquirepersonalprotectionshieldsforusebypatrolofficersandothersinmanagingsomecriticalincidents.Officerswithaccesstopersonalprotectionshieldsshouldbeadequatelytrainedonhowtousetheshieldsbothindividuallyandaspartofateamoperation.
GuidingPrinciples:InformationIssuesINFORMATIONISSUES29.Welltrainedcall-takersanddispatchersareessentialtothepoliceresponsetocriticalincidents. Anumberofcontroversialusesofforcebypolicehavestemmedfromfailuresofdispatcherstoobtain,orrelaytorespondingofficers,criticallyimportantinformationaboutthenatureoftheincident.
12011ElectronicControlWeaponGuidelines.http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Use_of_Force/electronic%20control%20weapon%20guidelines%202011.pdf
Agenciesshouldensurethatcall-takersanddispatchersreceivethorough,hands-ontrainingtosupportthepoliceresponsetocriticalincidentsthatmayinvolvetheuseofforce.Thistrainingshouldincludedealingwithpersonswithmentalhealthproblems(includingcommunicatingwithfamilymembersandagencyprotocols),crisiscommunications,use-of-forcepolicy,andde-escalationstrategies.Aspartoftheirtraining,call-takersanddispatchersshouldtakepartinride-alongswithpatrolofficersandspecializedunits,andtheyshouldactivelyparticipateintheagency’smentalhealthtrainingprograms.INFORMATIONISSUES30.Educatethefamiliesofpersonswithmentalhealthproblemsoncommunicatingwithcall-takers. AgenciesshouldworkwiththeirlocalmentalhealthprovidercommunityandorganizationssuchastheNationalAllianceonMentalIllness(NAMI)tocreateoutreachandeducationprogramsforthefamiliesofpersonswithmentalhealthproblems.Specifically,agenciesshouldinstructfamilymembersonthetypesofinformationanddetailstheyshouldprovidewhencalling9-1-1foranincidentinvolvingtheirlovedones.Thistypeofoutreachcanminimizeanystigmafamilymembersmayfeelandincreasetheirconfidenceinthepoliceresponse.Itwillalsohelpensurethatcall-takers,dispatchers,andrespondingofficershaveamorecompletepictureofanymentalhealthissuesassociatedwithacallforservice.
