•1-1: From the warfighting functions (Information, Intelligence, Logistics or Force Protection), identify which function you believe holds the most importance
in Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. Justify your response with specific examples.
• 1-2: Consider the relationships required between the DoD and other elements of the US government for Crisis Response and Limited Contingency
Operations. As a potential planner/leader for MAGTF involvement in these operations, what challenges and pitfalls can you anticipate based on the nature of
the relationships between the various US government elements? How can the pitfalls and challenges identified be mitigated? Do the same mitigations apply
for relationship challenges with nongovernmental organizations? Justify your response.
• 2-1: With the availability of precision strike weapons, when and under what circumstances would an amphibious raid be more appropriate than a strike?
Since amphibious raids are conducted so infrequently, why does a large portion of MEU pre-deployment training consist of the planning and execution of
amphibious raids?
• 2-2: As discussed in the readings, Admiral McRaven states that relative superiority in a raid is challenging to achieve and maintain, and if lost, is difficult to
regain. What do you think typically causes a raid force to lose relative superiority? In which of the five phases do you believe the raid force is most vulnerable
to losing relative superiority? How can that concern be mitigated?
